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ABSTRACT
We coin the term Protocols for Loanable Funds (PLFs) to refer to pro-
tocols which establish distributed ledger-based markets for loanable
funds. PLFs are emerging as one of the main applications within De-
centralized Finance (DeFi), and use smart contract code to facilitate
the intermediation of loanable funds. In doing so, these protocols
allow agents to borrow and save programmatically. Within these
protocols, interest rate mechanisms seek to equilibrate the supply
and demand for funds. In this paper, we review the methodologies
used to set interest rates on three prominent DeFi PLFs, namely
Compound, Aave and dYdX. We provide an empirical examination
of how these interest rate rules have behaved since their inception
in response to differing degrees of liquidity. We then investigate
the market efficiency and inter-connectedness between multiple
protocols, examining first whether Uncovered Interest Parity holds
within a particular protocol and second whether the interest rates
for a particular token market show dependence across protocols,
developing a Vector Error Correction Model for the dynamics.
1 INTRODUCTION
A recent development within financial architecture based on de-
centralized ledgers, or DeFi for short, is the emergence of protocols
which facilitate programmatic borrowing and saving. Such pro-
tocols represent a significant advancement for DeFi due to the
importance of these operations to an economy. Markets for loan-
able funds, a matching market for savers and would-be borrowers,
in principle enable agents to engage in intertemporal consumption
smoothing, whereby agents choose their present and future con-
sumption to maximize their overall welfare [10]. That is, access
to loans enables a borrower to consume more today than their
income would permit, paying back the loan when their income is
higher. On the other hand, savers, for whom income is higher than
their present consumption, are able to deposit their funds and earn
interest on them [22, 25].
Here, we term protocols that intermediate funds between users
as Protocols for Loanable Funds (PLFs). In doing so, we note such
protocols are not directly acting as a fully-fledged replacement for
banks, not least because traditional banks are not intermediaries
of loanable funds: rather, they provide financing through money
creation [14] (see Section 3). Further, at present PLFs only offer
secured lending, where agents can only borrow an amount pro-
vided they can front at least this amount as collateral. This reflects
the trustless setting within which PLFs operate: absent the typi-
cal repurcussions of reneging on debt commitments in traditional
finance since in DeFi agents could simply default on their loans
without recourse.1 Therefore, at present the extent to which PLFs
1The enforcement of strong-identities, a mapping of on-chain to real world identities,
would plausibly alter this tradeoff.
facilitate ‘true’ borrowing—where an agent gets into a position of
net debt—is limited.
In PLFs, interest rates reflect the prevailing price of funds result-
ing from supply and demand. The mechanism used to set these rates
is therefore a crucial aspect of protocol design: it provides the pre-
conditions under which the process of tatonnement—or reaching
the equilibrium—occurs [28]. In traditional finance, interest rates
are primarily set by central banks—via a base rate—and function
as a key lever in the management of credit in economies [4, 21].
The lowering of the base rate makes it relatively cheaper to borrow,
while discouraging saving. In the context of PLFs, the interest rate
setting mechanism is decided upon at the protocol level, commonly
via a governance process.
In this paper, we seek to gain insights into how currently-deployed
PLFs operate, setting out the interest ratemodels they employ.More-
over we seek to characterize the periods of illiquidity—roughly,
where most of the funds within a PLF are loaned out and unavail-
able for withdrawal by their depositors—that these protocols have
experienced. We then seek to understand how efficient these proto-
cols are at present, investigating whether the no-arbitrage condition
of Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) holdswithin a particular protocol.
The efficiency of the markets serves to provide indication of the
level of financial maturity, as well as the responsiveness of agents to
economic incentives. Finally, we look at the interrelation of interest
rate markets across protocols, developing a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM) for the dynamics between Compound [9], dYdX [8]
and Aave [1] in the markets for the stablecoins DAI and USDC.
Contributions
This paper makes the following contributions:
• We provide a taxonomy of the interest rate models currently
employed by PLFs, resulting in three categories: linear, non-
linear and kinked rates.
• We collect and analyze data on interest rates, utilization and
the total funds borrowed and supplied on three of the largest
PLFs. We have made the dataset publicly available.
• We present the first liquidity study of the markets for DAI,
ETH and USDC across these PLFs, finding that periods of
illiquidity are common, often shared between protocols and
that liquidity reserves can be very unbalanced, with in some
cases as few as three accounts controlling c. 50% of the total
liquidity. We also find that realized interest rates tend to
cluster around the kink of a kinked interest rate model.
• Investigating the largest PLF, Compound, we find that the
no arbitrage condition of Uncovered Interest Parity typically
does not hold, suggesting that at markets associated with
these protocols may be relatively inefficient and agents may
not be optimally reacting to interest rate incentives.
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• We examine the market dependence between PLFs and find
that the borrowing interest rates exhibit some interdepen-
dence, with Compound appearing to influence borrowing
rates on other, smaller PLFs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents relevant background material, while Section 3 outlines the
general design of PLFs. Section 4 presents a taxonomy of different
interest rate models. Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide an analysis on
market liquidity, efficiency and dependence, respectively. Section 8
discusses related work, before Section 9 concludes.
2 BACKGROUND
2.1 Ethereum
The Ethereum [30] blockchain allows its users to run smart con-
tracts, programs designed to run on its distributed infrastructure.
Smart contracts and the interactions between them are fundamen-
tal building blocks of DeFi. They are almost feature-equivalent
to programs written in any Turing-complete language but have a
few particularities. For instance, smart contracts must be strictly
deterministic. For this reason, they can only communicate with
the outside world through transactions executed on the Ethereum
blockchain. On the other hand, smart contracts can easily interact
with other smart contracts, allowing complex interactions between
different parties as long as these interactions happen directly on
chain. Another particularity of Ethereum smart contracts is their
atomicity: they can only be executed within a transaction. If an
error happens during the execution, the transaction is reverted. In
such an event, any change of state that occurred in this contract or
any other interaction with other contracts will be reverted and no
change of state will happen.
2.2 DeFi
DeFi refers to a financial system which relies for its security and
integrity on distributed ledger technology. Applications of such
technology include lending, decentralized exchange, derivatives
and payments. At the time of writing on 9 June 2020, DeFi has a
total value locked of over 1bn USD, with most applications deployed
on the Ethereum blockchain [23]. Unlike regular finance where the
identity of all participants is known and correct behavior can be
enforced via regulation, DeFi actors are pseudonymous and DeFi
systems need other means to prevent users from misbehaving. In
the absence of traditional credit-rating mechanisms, the system
rules are typically “enforced” by incentivizing actors to behave
according to the rules of the system [13].
2.3 DeFi lending markets
PLFs intermediate markets for loanable funds, with suppliers of
funds earning interest. As mentioned above, protocols need to pro-
tect against borrowers defaulting on their debt obligations. Where
loans need to be valid for more than a single transaction, this
protection is currently achieved by requiring borrowers to over-
collateralize their loans, allowing the lender to redeem the pledged
collateral should a borrower default on a position2. Where the loan
2Therefore loans of this type on DeFi lending protocols are instances of secured loans,
where an agent can only borrow against collateral they already own; they cannot enter
into ‘net debt’. We address this further in Section 3.
needs to be valid only for a single transaction, flash loans enable
agents to borrow without collateral, whereby the loaned amount is
protected by the atomicity afforded by smart contracts: if the loan
is not repaid with interest, the whole transaction is reversed [1].
In the context of lending protocols, a borrower defaults on a loan
when the value of the locked collateral drops below some fixed
liquidation threshold. The over-collateralization and liquidation
thresholds vary between asset markets across different protocols.
In an event of default, the lending protocol seizes and liquidates
the locked collateral at a discount to cover the underlying debt.
Additionally, a penalty fee is charged against the debt, prior to
paying out the remaining collateral to the borrower.
2.4 Stablecoins
In order for a cryptoasset to be a viable medium of exchange and
store of value, price stability needs to be guaranteed. Stablecoins
are cryptoassets which possess a price stabilization mechanism to
maintain some target peg. Here we briefly outline two of the most
widely used stabilization mechanisms [20]:
Fiat-collateralized. Each unit of stablecoin is pegged to some
fixed amount of fiat currency (typically USD). This is gen-
erally realized via a network of banks maintaining the fiat
collateral and is therefore not decentralized. Stablecoins such
as USDT [16] and USDC [6] belong in this category.
Cryptoasset-collateralized. Each unit of stablecoin is backed
by an amount of some other cryptoasset. A stabilization
mechanism is needed to protect against the volatility of the
collateral. Perhaps the most prominent of such stablecoins
is DAI [17]. In order to borrow newly minted units of DAI,
where one DAI is pegged to 1 USD, a user has to pledge
an over-collateralized amount of cryptocurrency (e.g. ETH),
which becomes locked up in a smart contract. In case the
price of DAI deviates from its peg, arbitrageurs are incen-
tivized to buy or sell DAI should the price drop below or rise
above 1 USD, respectively. A borrower of DAI has to ensure
to keep the associated collateralization ratio above some liq-
uidation threshold, as otherwise the borrow position will be
liquidated at a discount and a penalty fee will be charged
against the debt.
3 PROTOCOLS FOR LOANABLE FUNDS
3.1 Comparison to traditional lending
PLFs facilitate the matching of would-be borrowers and lenders,
with the interest rate set programmatically. Importantly, unlike
peer-to-peer lending, funds are pooled, such that a lender may lend
to a number of borrowers and vice versa. In so doing, an open
lending protocol provides a market for loanable funds, where the
role that an intermediary would play in traditional finance has been
replaced by a set of smart contracts.
It should be stated that by creating markets for loanable funds—
as protocols for loanable funds—such protocols are not functionally
equivalent to banks. The construal of banks as primarily intermedi-
aries of loanable funds, as in some economic theory, has been de-
bunked (see e.g. [14]). Rather than accepting deposits of pre-existing
funds from savers and then lending these funds out to borrowers,
banks primarily provide financing throughmoney creation, creating
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new money at the point of making a loan and constrained by their
profitability and solvency requirements [14]. Therefore since banks
are not primarily ILFs, PLFs are not functional replacements.
3.2 Use cases
The introduction of PLFs significantly extends the existing trad-
ing capabilities in DeFi, offering several use cases for DeFi actors.
Predominantly, PLFs empower decentralized margin trading by
facilitating short sells and leveraged longs. In a short sell, a trader
sells the borrowed funds, seeking to make a profit by repurchasing
the borrow position at a lower price. Similarly, in a leveraged long a
trader buys some other asset with the borrowed funds and profits in
case the purchased asset appreciates in value. As a consequence of
margin trading, suppliers of loanable funds are able to earn interest.
A further use case of PLFs lies in borrowers being able to leverage
their funds as collateral, while maintaining the right to repurchase
the collateralized token, thereby not giving up direct ownership.
3.3 Design space dimensions
3.3.1 Interest rate model. Suppliers of loanable funds receive in-
terest over time, while borrowers have to pay interest. A key differ-
entiating factor across lending protocols is the chosen interest rate
model, which is generally some linear or non-linear function of
the available liquidity in a market. As loans on protocols for loan-
able funds have unlimited maturities, variable interest rates may
fluctuate from the opening of a borrow position. By using variable
rate models, lending protocols are able to dynamically adjust the
interest rate depending on the ratio of funds borrowed to supplied,
which can prove particularly useful during periods of low liquidity
by incentivizing borrowers to repay their loans.
3.3.2 Reserve factor. Additionally, lending protocols employ a re-
serve factor, specifying the amount of a borrower’s accrued interest
to be deducted and set aside for periods of illiquidity. Hence, the
interest earned by lenders is a function of the interest paid by
borrowers less the reserve factor.
3.3.3 Interest disbursement mechanism. Interest is typically ac-
crued per second and paid out on a per block basis. Since the re-
peated payment to lenders of the accrued interest (denoted in the
supplied token) would incur undesired transaction costs, accrued
interest is often payed out through the use of interest-bearing de-
rivative tokens, which are ERC-20 tokens that are minted upon the
deposit of funds and burned when redeemed. Each market has such
an associated derivative token, which appreciates with respect to
the underlying asset at the same rate as interest is compounded,
thereby accruing interest for the token holder. Even though loans
are made with indefinite maturity, a loan is liquidated should the
value of the borrowed asset’s underlying collateral fall below a
fixed liquidation threshold. In the case of an undercollateralized
borrow position, so-called liquidators can purchase the collateral
at a discount and a penalty fee is imposed upon the borrower.
3.3.4 Governance mechanism. A critical component of lending
protocols is decentralized governance. Lending protocols tend to
achieve decentralized governance through the use of ERC-20 gover-
nance tokens specific to the lending protocol, whereby token hold-
ers’ votes are weighted proportionally to their stake. Token holders
are thereby empowered to propose new features and changes to
the existing protocol.
4 INTEREST RATE MODELS
In this section, we outline the main classes of interest rate models
employed by PLFS. We also describe an approach that has been
taken to enable these variable rate models to offer more interest
rate stability. We illustrate each case with an example taken from
an implemented protocol.
Definitions. For a marketm, total loans L and gross deposits A,
we define the utilization of deposited funds in that market as
Um =
L
A
(1)
The Interest Rate Index I for block k is calculated each time an
interest rate changes, i.e. as users mint, redeem, borrow, repay or
liquidate assets. It is given by:
Ik,m = Ik−1,m (1 + rt) (2)
where r denotes the per block interest rate and t denotes the differ-
ence in block height. Therefore debt D in a market is given by
Dk,m = Dk−1,m (1 + rt) (3)
where a portion of the interest is kept as a reserve (Π), set by reserve
factor λ:
Πm = Πk−1,m + Dk−1,m (rtλ) (4)
We now turn to the classification of the extant interest rates into
three main models.
4.1 Model one: linear rates
The first model we present is one in which interest rates are set as
a linear function of utilization. With a linear interest rate model,
interest rates are determined algorithmically as the equilibrium
value in a loanable marketm, where the borrowing interest rates
ib are given by (e.g., following Compound [9]):
ib,m = α + βUm (5)
where α is some constant and β a slope coefficient on the re-
sponsiveness of the borrowing interest rate to the utilization rate.
Saving interest rates is are given by:
is,m = (α + βUm )Um (6)
where in essence the interest rate ib,m is scaled by the utilization
to arrive at an interest rate for saving that is lower than that of the
rate paid by borrowers. This serves to ensure that the interest rate
spread (ib,m − is,m ) is positive. Some portion of this spread can be
kept for reserves.
4.2 Model two: non-linear rates
Interest rates may also be set non-linearly, and here we present the
non-linear continuous model employed by dYdX [8]. For a loanable
funds marketm, the borrowing interest rates ib follow a non-linear
model and are computed as:
ib,m = (α ·Um ) + (β ·U 32m ) + (γ ·U 64m ). (7)
The saving interest rates is with reserve factor λ are given by:
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Protocol Interest RateModel
Stable
Interest Rate
Variable
Interest Rate
Governance
Token
Interest-bearing
Derivative Token
Additional
Functionalities
Compound Kinked ✗ ✓ ✓ ✓ –
Aave Kinked ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Swap rates, flash loans
dYdX Non-linear ✗ ✓ ✗ ✗ Decentralized Exchange
Table 1: Comparison of different protocols for loanable funds.
is,m = (1 − λ) · ib,m ·Um (8)
In comparison to the linear rate model, a non-linear model allows
for the interest rate to increase at an increasing rate as the protocol
becomes more heavily utilized, creating an non-linearly increasing
incentive for suppliers to supply to the protocol and for borrowers
to repay their borrows.
4.3 Model three: kinked rates
In the final interest rate model, interest rates exhibit some form of
kink: they sharply change at some defined threshold. Such interest
rates are employed by a number of protocols, including [1, 9].
Mathematically, kinked interest rates can be characterized as
follows.
ib =
{
α + βU ifU ≤ U ∗
α + βU ∗ + γ (U −U ∗) ifU > U ∗ (9)
where α denotes a per-block base rate, β denotes a per-block
multiplier, U denotes the utilization ratio (with U ∗ denoting the
optimal utilization ratio) and γ denotes a ‘jump’ multiplier.
In the case of Compound, the associated saving rates are given
by Equation (10).
is = U (ib (1 − λ)) (10)
where λ is a reserve factor.
Such models share the property of sharply changing the incen-
tives for borrowers and savers beyond some utilization threshold,
as with the non-linear model. However, they also introduce a point
of sharp change in the interest rate, beyond which the interest
rates starts to sharply rise, in contrast to non-linear models with no
kink. Therefore it might be expected that this kink would become
a Schelling point of convergence among agents [26].
4.4 Making rates stable
Some platforms, such as Aave, allow the borrower to choose between
a variable and a stable interest rate. However, it is important to note
that the “stable” interest rate is not entirely stable, as it can be revised
in the event that it significantly deviates from the market average.
Examining Aave’s implementation in detail, we first present their
instantiation of a kinked interest rate model before showing how
the stable rate is derived.
The variable interest rate is based on several parameters defined
by the system. Given the utilization rateU of a particular asset, the
parameter Uoptimal is the optimal utilization. In practice, this value
was set to 0.8 and has been updated to 0.9 in May 2020 [11]. Two
interest rate slopes, parameters of the system, are used to compute
the variable interest rate: Rslope1 is used when U < Uoptimal and
Rslope2 when U ≥ Uoptimal. Finally, given a base variable borrow
rate ib,m,v0 , the variable borrow interest rate ib for marketm is
computed as follows:
ib,m,v =

ib,m,v0 +
U
Uoptimal
· Rslope1 ifU < Uoptimal
ib,m,v0 + Rslope1 +
U−Uoptimal
1−Uoptimal · Rslope2 ifU ≥ Uoptimal
(11)
To compute the stable rate, Aave computes the lending protocol-
wide market ratemr as the arithmetic mean of the total borrowed
funds weighted by the borrow rate ib,m for given platform p as
follows:
mr =
∑n
p=1 ib,m,p · Bm,p∑n
p=1 Bm,p
(12)
where Bm,p denotes the total amount of borrowed funds for
marketm on lending protocol p. Hence, using themr as the base
rate, the stable borrowing rate ib,s for a marketm is given by:
ib,m,s =

mr +
U
Uoptimal
· Rslope1 ifU < Uoptimal
mr + Rslope1 +
U−Uoptimal
1−Uoptimal · Rslope2 ifU ≥ Uoptimal
(13)
In case the stable rate deviates too much from the market rate, it
will be revised. The stable borrow rate ib,m,s for user z is revised
upwards to the most recent stable borrow rate for the respective
market when
ib,m,s,z <
Bm,v · ib,m,v + Bm,s · ib,m,s
Bm,v + Bm,s
(14)
If (14) holds, a borrower of funds would be able to earn interest
from a borrow position. On the contrary, should the stable rate of a
borrow position exceed the latest stable rate it would be adjusted
downwards should
ib,m,s,z > ib,m,s · (1 + ∆ib,m,s,t ) (15)
where ∆ib,m,s,t denotes the change in the stable rate for a spec-
ified adjustment window t . Note that unlike for variable interest
rate denominated loans, stable rate loans have a definite maturity.
4.5 Summary
We have reviewed the three main interest rate models for variable
interest rates, and explained a mechanism which seeks to bring
stability to these rates. An emergent key feature of these models
is the incentive they provide to borrowers and savers at times of
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high utilization. In the next section, this behavior at high utilization
becomes a central object of concern.
5 MARKET LIQUIDITY
In this section we provide an analysis of liquidity and interest rates
for loanable funds markets on Compound, dYdX and Aave.
5.1 Liquidity and illiquidity across PLFs
The total amount of locked loanable funds for the largest markets
across Compound, Aave and dYdX are given in Table 2.
Currency Total Amount Locked
(median in millions of USD)
Compound Aave dYdX
(W)ETH 76.58 4.80 19.41
USDC 31.54 4.12 6.58
DAI 24.82 0.95 4.64
SAI 36.94 - -
USDT - 3.92 -
BAT 0.95 0.08 -
LEND - 3.60 -
LINK - 12.21 -
Table 2: Median of total supply of loanable funds in USD
for the largest markets on Compound, Aave and dYdX, since
each market’s inception until 7 May 2020.
It can be seen that ETH, USDC and DAI account for the majority
of loanable funds on all three PLFs.3 Hence we focus on these
markets for an in-depth analysis. From Figure 1 it becomes apparent
that these three markets are very similar in terms of their average
borrow and utilization rates, particularly for DAI and ETH.
5.1.1 Liquidity. The available liquidity for loanable funds for an
asset is given by the difference between the total supply and total
borrows in the respective market. High liquidity allows actors to
borrow funds at lower rates, while guaranteeing suppliers of funds
that funds can be withdrawn at any point in time. On the one
hand, regarding the liquidity for ETH (see Figure 2) all three PLFs
maintain high liquidity over time, largely due to the total borrows
remaining relatively stable. On the other hand, the markets for DAI
and USDC (see Figures 3 and 4) frequently exhibit periods of much
lower liquidity, with utilization exceeding 80% and 90% respectively.
Moreover, it appears that such periods of low liquidity are to some
extent shared across protocols, in particular for the smaller PLFs
dYdX and Aave for the period January to mid-March 2020.
On Thursday March 12, 2020—Black Thursday [24]—the total
amount of locked funds across all DeFi protocols dropped from
897.2m USD to 559.42m USD.4 For DAI, it can be seen how on
Black Thursday even the largest PLF, Compound, was exposed
to prolonged periods of low liquidity, before attracting increased
liquidity again at the same time as dYdX and Aave. However, after
3As single-collateral DAI (SAI) has been replaced by multi-collateral DAI (DAI), we
solely focus on the latter for this analysis.
4Source: https://defipulse.com. Accessed: 05-06-2020.
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Figure 1: Average utilization and borrow interest rates for
all markets on Aave, Compound and dYdX.
Figure 2: Total funds borrowed and supplied (i.e. liquidity)
for ETH markets on dYdX, Compound and Aave.
mid-April, the market for DAI on Compound re-experienced low
liquidity.
5.1.2 Illiquidity. On PLFs agents are incentivized to provide liq-
uidity via the employed interest rate model, as high interest rates
would make borrowing more cost prohibitive in periods of low
liquidity. However, if borrowers are not incentivized to repay their
loans by sufficiently high interest rates at times of full utilization,
insufficient liquidity may materialize. In the event of such illiquidity
materializing, suppliers of funds would be unable to withdraw them,
being forced to hold on to and continue to earn interest through
their cTokens.
Out of the three PLFs, only Aave enforces a utilization ceiling
at 100%, while Compound and dYdX permit borrows even beyond
full utilization. When examining the market for DAI in Figure 5, it
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Figure 3: Total funds borrowed and supplied (i.e. liquidity)
for DAI markets on dYdX, Compound and Aave. Periods
where utilization was between 80% and 90% are highlighted
in salmon,while utilizationhigher than 90% is shaded in red.
Figure 4: Total funds borrowed and supplied (i.e. liquidity)
for USDC markets on dYdX, Compound and Aave. Periods
where utilization was between 80% and 90% are highlighted
in salmon,while utilizationhigher than 90% is shaded in red.
can be seen how utilization of funds has in the past been multiple
times at and even above 100% on Compound and dYdX.
It can be seen that Aave has experienced periods of near-illiquidity,
while Compound and dYdX have experienced periods of full illiquid-
ity for DAI, i.e. all supplied funds were loaned out. When comparing
the DAI borrow rates during periods of full utilization (red) in Fig-
ure 5, notable differences can be made out between the different
interest rate regimes. On dYdX, the borrow rate hits the by the
Figure 5: Utilization and borrow rates for DAI on Aave (top),
dYdX (middle) and Compound (bottom). Time periods in
which utilization equaled or exceeded 100% are highlighted
in red.
model imposed interest rate ceiling of 50%, while on Compound,
the rate does not exceed 25% even at full utilization, which can be
explained by the linear nature of Compound’s interest rates. De-
spite Aave never reaching full utilization for DAI, due to an optimal
utilization target of 80% during the measurement period, borrow
rates on Aave exceed rates on Compound during periods of high
utilization. This suggests that holding on to loans during periods of
illiquidity is notably cheaper on Compound than on dYdX or Aave.
5.1.3 Fund distribution. Periods of low liquidity have several impli-
cations for market participants. On one side, high utilization implies
lucrative interest rates for suppliers of funds, thereby attracting
new liquidity. On the other hand, suppliers are faced with the risk
of being unable to redeem their funds, for example, in the case of a
‘bank run’.
In order to better assess the risk of a market becoming fully
illiquid, we examine the cumulative percentage of locked funds for
the number of Ethereum accounts on Compound in Figure 6. Note
that as a similar pattern was found for Aave and dYdX, we decided
to solely focus on Compound. The distribution of funds across
accounts is very similar for DAI, ETH and USDC in that a very
small set of accounts controls the majority of all supplied funds. For
instance, 50.3% of total locked DAI is controlled by only 3 accounts.
Similarly, for ETH and USDC, the same number of accounts control
60.0% and 47.3%, respectively. Hence, for all three markets, even in
times of high liquidity, a small number of suppliers of funds are in
a position to to drastically reduce liquidity, or possibly even cause
full illiquidity.
5.2 Case Study: DAI on Compound
In the context of liquidity, we present a case study of interest rate
behavior in the market for DAI on Compound, focusing on the
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(c) USDC
Figure 6: Cumulative percentage of locked funds on Com-
pound for DAI, ETH and USDC on 2020-06-04.
period of 21 February to 21 April 2020 and its interest-bearing
token cDAI. It could be seen in Figure 5 that for the aforementioned
period, this market was exposed to a range of different utilization
levels, experiencing periods of relatively high liquidity but also
illiquidity. Hence, we investigate market participants’ behavior—
given by the interest rates that are actually observed—for different
interest rate regimes during the period of interest.
Interest rate models for the cDAI contract. To illustrate kinked
rates, we present the case of the DAI interest rate in Compound
Finance. The cDAI token is an example of an interest-bearing de-
rivative token based on a linear kinked interest rate model. Since
the 17th December 2019, the borrowing rates (ib ) have operated
with Equation (9). However, the precise parameter values used by
the model have been revised multiple times. We include a list of
these modifications in Table 3 in the appendix.
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Figure 7: Three interest rate regimes in Compound.
Interest rate behavior. We consider in detail how since 17 Decem-
ber 2019 agents have optimized their selection of borrowing and
saving amounts given an interest rate schedule. Here we focus on
a subset of three periods, namely:
• 21 February - 13 March 2020
• 14 March - 5 April 2020
• 6 April - 21 April 2020
At the start of each of these periods, the interest rate parameters
were changed to values as specified in Table 3. Here we plot the
behavior of the borrowing rates, but the behavior for the supply
rates is broadly similar.
Figure 8a and the corresponding Figure 9 plot the interest rate
model (the blue surface) as well as the realized interest rate (red
crosses). The two points to note are that (i) there appears to be a
clustering of the realized interest rates at the kink of the interest
rate function and (ii) otherwise, interest rates are typically higher
than the kink, corresponding to a utilization of above 90%.
Figure 8b shows the interest rate model and the realized interest
rates in the next period, after the base rate α is reduced via a
parameter change by 49.04%. Despite this change, we continue
to observe a clustering of the realized interest rates at the kink,
although there does appear to be some effect of reducing the typical
utilization ratio to below the kink.
Figure 8c shows how the system behaves once the base rate α
is set to zero, while the multiplier β is increased by nearly 1000%.
Again, we observe a similar pattern: most of the realized interest
rates appear to be at the kink. However, if not at the kink, now
typically utilization is above 90%.
5.3 Summary
We saw that, especially for DAI, there were several periods of
illiquidity and that theywere often shared across the three protocols.
We also showed that the locked funds were very concentrated and
that a very small amount of accounts had the potential to make
the markets illiquid. Finally, we analyzed the interest rate behavior
of DAI on Compound and showed that during all the observation
periods, the interest rates appeared clustered around the kink of
the interest rate function.
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Figure 8: Borrowing rates surface for DAI.
6 MARKET EFFICIENCY
In this section we consider the capital market efficiency of DeFi
lending protocols. Loosely, a capital market is said to be efficient if
in the process of determining prices, it fully and correctly reflects
all relevant information [19]. More precisely:
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Figure 9: Borrowing rate distribution around kink, 21 Febru-
ary - 13 March.
Definition 6.1 (Market efficiency). A market is efficient with re-
spect to some information set ϕ if prices would be unaffected by
revealing that information to all market participants [19].
A notable consequence of Definition 6.1 is that such efficiency
implies it the impossibility of making economic profits on the basis
of the information set ϕ. The market efficiency of PLFs is a question
of central interest because it provides a mechanism to assess the
maturity of the markets and to understand the responsiveness of
agents to changes in the information set ϕ. Moreover, since a core
mechanism common to many PLFs is the use of high interest rates
at times of high utilization—to encourage saving and discourage
borrowing, incentivizing agents to behave in a certain way—the
extent to which PLFS are capital efficient will inform how reliable
this mechanism is, at present, in incentivizing agents to act in the
intended way. If agents do not in fact respond to high interest rates
by reducing their borrowing requirements and increasing their
supply of funds to a PLF, illiquidity resulting from high utilization
rates on a given protocol may be expected to result. Such illiquidity
events, where agents cannot withdraw their funds, can be expected
to cause panic in financial markets. Therefore from the point of
view of financial risk, the efficiency of markets is of central interest.
Thus in this section we consider whether PLFs are efficient
within a given protocol, considering Compound [9] within a frame-
work which is standard in assessing the efficiency of markets in
the context of foreign exchange: Uncovered Interest Parity.
6.1 Uncovered Interest Parity
First, we set out Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) as it would nor-
mally appear in the context of foreign exchange between two coun-
tries: domestic and foreign. An investor has the choice of whether
to hold domestic or foreign assets. UIP is a theoretical no-arbitrage
condition, which states that in equilibrium, if the condition holds,
a risk-neutral investor should be indifferent between holding the
domestic or foreign assets because the exchange rate is expected to
adjust such that returns are equivalent.
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around kink for DAI.
For example, consider UIP holding between GBP and USD. An
investor starting with Âč1m at t = 0 could either:
• receive a return of (e.g.) 3% in GBP at t = 1, resulting in
Âč1.03m
• buy $1.23m USD at t = 0 with an exchange rate of 1.23
GBP/USD, receive a higher return of 5%, resulting in $1.2915m,
but then on account of a falling exchange rate, now at 1.254
GBP/USD, resulting in Âč1.03m.
Therefore if UIP holds, despite the higher interest rate (5% for
USD vs 3% for GBP), adjustments in the exchange rate between
the currencies offset any potential gain: arbitrage is not possible.
Therefore mathematically, UIP can be stated as follows.
1 + ιi =
Et [St+k ]
St
(1 + ι j ) (16)
where Et [St+k ] denotes the expectation in period t of the ex-
change rate between assets i and j at time t + k , k is an arbitrary
number of periods into the future, St is the current spot exchange
rate between assets i and j, ιi is the interest rate payable on asset i
and ι j is the interest rate payable on asset j. If Equation (16) holds,
then investors cannot make risk free profit.
6.2 UIP in a PLF
Here, analogously, we perform a pairwise analysis of all possible
pairs of tokens available within a protocol, seeking to establish
whether UIP holds for that pair. For UIP to hold it must be the case
that a risk-neutral investor would be indifferent between saving
(or borrowing) either of the tokens within the pair, because the
exchange rate between any token pair adjusts such that no risk-free
profit can be made. As it is the largest PLF [23], we consider to what
extent the condition holds within Compound [9].
6.3 Empirical approach
To develop our empirical specification, we assume that agents have
rational expectations:
St+k = Et[St+k ] + ϵt+k (17)
where ϵ denotes a random error. We test whether UIP obtains with
the following empirical specification.
St+1 − St = α + β(ιi − ι j ) + ϵ (18)
H0 Strict form UIP: α = 0 and β = 1 (19)
Alternatively, we could impose no restriction on α perhaps reflect-
ing a risk premium [3].
H’0 Weak form UIP: β = 1 (20)
The existence of a risk premium reflects the extra return in the
form of interest payment is required in order for investors to receive
the same risk-adjusted return as on a less risky token. We test both
hypotheses, considering all possible token pairings on Compound
and reporting borrowing and saving interest rates separately.
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6.4 UIP regression results - borrowing rates
For both borrowing and saving rate regressions, we use heteroskedas-
ticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, which we report
in brackets in the results. We find that for the 28 market pairs, the
evidence suggests that in 8 cases UIP in both weak and strong form
holds: we are unable to reject the null hypotheses of 19 and 20 at
the 1% significance level. However, in all but one of the cases, the
standard errors are large, such that it would be difficult to reject any
null hypothesis. The one case with statistical evidence consistent
for the UIP is the ETH/REP pair, where the β coefficient is statisti-
cally indistinguishable from 1 and the standard error is relatively
small. The results are reported in table 6 in the appendix. Overall,
for daily data on borrowing rates we find very weak evidence that
in some cases UIP may hold, but that in most cases it does not and
we are able to reject both H0 and H’0 at the 1% level.
6.5 UIP regression results - saving rates
Looking now at saving rates, first, similar to the borrowing case,
we find that in 7/28 cases (the same market pairs as for borrowing
rates, aside from ETH/BAT), UIP in both weak and strong forms
seems to hold (that is, we are unable to reject either H0 or H’0).
However, again the standard errors are typically large, such that it
would be difficult to reject any hypothesis. The results are reported
in table 7 in the appendix. Overall, for daily data on saving rates
we again find only very weak evidence that in some cases UIP may
hold.
6.6 Summary
Looking at daily frequency data for borrowing and saving, we
find only very weak evidence that UIP holds in some cases. This
therefore suggests that overall the markets within the Compound
PLF may not be fully capital efficient at present, and it seems prima
facie plausible that these results are not only idiosyncratically true
of Compound. The finding that this PLF is not capital efficient
at the daily frequency is not surprising - there is considerable of
evidence that UIP does not hold even in traditional foreign exchange
markets [7]. However, we submit that in the context of a PLF, to
the extent that there is market inefficiency, agents may not be fully
responding to these incentives.
7 MARKET DEPENDENCE
We now consider the extent of inter-connectedness between pro-
tocols by considering how changes in an interest rate for a given
token on one PLF are related to changes in the interest rate for the
token on another PLF.
For example, consider the borrowing rate for DAI, ib,Dai . A pri-
ori, we would expect that if ib,Dai is higher on one PLF than others,
agents would be incentivized to borrow from those PLFs with a
lower borrowing rate, deleveraging on one PLF and leveraging on
others. But this influx of borrowers for the token on other PLFs
would, in turn, increase the borrowing rates on those protocols.
In this section, taking the stablecoins DAI and USDC, we investi-
gate whether there is evidence of such dynamics, and find that such
behavior is indeed observable. Moreover, we quantify the speed of
adjustment to new equilibria values, and in so doing measure in
one way the responsiveness of agents to their incentives in PLFs.
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Figure 11: Daily borrowing interest rates on DAI across pro-
tocols.
7.1 Vector Error Correction Models
Wemodel both the short and long run dynamics between borrowing
rates for DAI and USDC by using a Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM).
Where time series are non-stationary (e.g. a random walk), the
required criteria for a regression to produce be the Best Linear
Unbiased Estimator (BLUE) are not satisfied, because the variables
are not covariance stationary.5 However, if there exists a linear
combination of non-stationary time series, where this combination
is itself stationary, the series are said to be cointegrated. VECMs
permit the modelling of the stationary relationships between such
time series, and allow estimation of both the long-run and short-run
adjustment dynamics. A VECM model is as follows.
∆yt = v + Πyt−1 +
p−1∑
i=1
Γi∆yt−i + ϵi (21)
where ∆ denotes a single time step, yt is a vector of K variables,
v is a vector of K × 1 parameters, Π = ∑j=pj=1 Aj − Ik (Ik denotes
an indicator vector), where Aj is a matrix of K × K parameters
from a vector autoregression (VAR)6, Γi = −∑j=pj=i+1 Aj and ϵ is a
K × 1 vector of disturbances. Assuming that Π has reduced rank
0 < r < K it can further be expressed as Π = αβ ′ [27]. In terms of
interpretation, α provides the adjustment coefficients, β provides
the parameters of the cointegrating (i.e. long-run) equations.
7.2 Results
Separately, we focus on the borrowing rates for DAI and USDC
separately, considering Compound, Aave and dYdX. We present the
borrowing rates for DAI in Figure 11 and for USDC in Figure 12.
DAI Results. First, we consider the markets for DAI. We do not
find evidence of a cointegrating relationship between DAI on dYdX
and either on Compound or Aave via a Johansen test [27], so we
5Covariance stationary means that the mean and autocovariances are finite and time
invariant.
6A VAR(p) can be expressed as yt = v + A1yt−1 + A2yt−2 + ... + Apyt−p + ϵ
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Figure 13: Impulse Response Function: impact of a shock to
Compound’s DAI borrow rate on Aave’s DAI borrow rate.
remove dYdX from the analysis. We find the optimum lag length to
be 4. The results are presented in full in Table 4 in the appendix.
In terms of short adjustment coefficients, we find a statistically
significant coefficient on Aave DAI of 0.3, such that when the
borrowing rate on Compound is high, Aave’s borrow rate quickly
adjusts by increasing to match it, at a speed of 0.3. Interestingly,
we do not find evidence of the Compound DAI rate adjusting to
changes in the Aave DAI rate, suggesting that Compound’s interest
rate changes drive changes in Aave’s borrowing rates, which may
suggest that Compound has market power. This is perhaps to be
expected: as we show in Fig. 3, Compound has the largest borrow
and supply volumes for DAI compared to the other two PLFs and
thus will plausibly shape interest rates across protocols. In terms of
long-run relationship between Aave DAI and Compound DAI, we
find that the series share a long run relationship, with each series
moving with the same sign.
We present the impact of a shock to Compound’s DAI borrow
rate on Aave’s in Figure 13. It can be seen that a positive shock to
the borrowing rate results in a permanent increase in the borrowing
rate on Aave.
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USDC Results. For USDC the results are reported in Table 5. For
USDC, we find that between the series there are 2 cointegrating
relationships [27] and therefore model all three series. In this case,
after iteratively tuning the model with postestimation results, we
find the optimum lag length to be 3.
It appears that again, Compound may have market power, with
the borrowing rates on Aave and dYdX adjusting to match the
Compound interest rate level. Aave appears to adjust with a faster
speed of 0.607, in comparison to dYdX at 0.115. In terms of long-run
relationships, we find that Compound and Aave share a long-run
relationship, and that Aave and dYdX share a long-run relationship.
We plot the impact of a change in the USDC borrowing rate in
Figure 14. A shock to Compound’s borrowing rate on USDC has a
permanent effect on the interest rates in Aave and dYdX.
7.3 Robustness checks
We performed extensive robustness checks on the fitted VECM
models. Since our ability to draw sound inference on the adjust-
ment parameters depends on the cointegrating equations being
stationary, we plot the cointegrating equations over time (see Fig-
ures 15, 16 and 17 in the appendix.) We argue that the cointegrating
equations appear without significant trends and therefore are sta-
tionary. Furthermore, we check that we have correctly specified the
number of cointegrating equations in Figures 18 and 19. We find no
evidence that any of the eigenvalues are close to the unit circle, and
therefore no evidence that the model is misspecified (see [27] for
details on this test.) Additionally, we test for serial correlation in
the residuals of the regressions and find no evidence of this. A test
for the normality of the errors in our models does suggest that the
errors are non-normally distributed, which may affect our standard
errors but should not result in parameter bias. Jointly this panel
of robustness tests gives us confidence that the VECM models are
reasonably well specified.
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7.4 Summary
Overall we find evidence of cointegrating relationships between
markets for DAI and USDC. In turn, this suggests that to some
extent interest rate changes in one protocol are associated with
interest rate changes in others, perhaps in turn providing evidence
of agents being incentivized to change protocol by the rates they
observe.Moreover, we also find some evidence of Compound having
market power.
8 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we present related work about interest rates in both
traditional finance as well as in DeFi protocols. This paper being,
to the best of our knowledge, the first academic work to analyze
in-depth PLFs, we include some non-academic work covering some
aspects of PLFs interest rates.
In [15], the author describes how the interest rate models work
in PLFs. The author first provides a definition of the utilization ratio
of a PLF, then describes linear and polynomial interest rate models
and finally presents how these different models are used by three
major PLFs, namely, Compound, dYdX and DDEX [29].
The author of [2] analyzes Compound to show the risks inherent
to decentralized lending. In particular, they focus on the risks asso-
ciated with illiquidity and bank runs. The authors analyze the SAI
market on compound and find that there were several periods of
near-illiquidity and actual-illiquidity. They present instances where
the illiquidity is created because of large loans in a short period
of time and others where it is created by the lenders withdrawing
large amount of funds they had locked. In particular, they show that
on five occasions, a single transaction was sufficient to withdraw
more than a quarter of the available liquidity, and in the worst
case a single transaction drained more than 95% of the available
liquidity.
The author of [12] focuses on how Black Thursday [24] in March
2020 affected the Aave market. They first show that the amount
of money borrowed through flash loans went up by more than
10,000% in only a few hours because users were leveraging these
to liquidate their collateralized debt positions [17, 18]. The author
also highlights the fact that the amount of borrows liquidated on
Aave during Black Thursday was more than 100 times higher than
the typical amount liquidated, reaching a total of more than $550k
USD in a single day. Finally, the author show that during the Black
Thursday crisis, some design flaws of MakerDAO’s protocol [17]
caused Maker to loose a total of more than $4m USD worth of
collateral.
In [14], the authors elucidate the difference between the inter-
mediation and financing roles of traditional banks, and show that
when modelling banks with financing models as opposed to inter-
mediation models, identical shocks have much greater effects on
the real economy.
Finally, Brody et al. [5] present a work about interest rates in the
context of cryptocurrencies but centered on a different problem.
The focus of their work lies on how cryptocurrencies could set an
interest rate for their holders, such that that they accumulate these
interest rates in a continuous manner.
9 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we coin the phrase Protocol for Loanable Funds, to
describe DeFi equivalents of Intermediaries for Loanable Funds in
traditional finance, providing a classification framework for the
extant interest rate models. We analyze three of the largest PLFs in
terms of market liquidity, efficiency and dependence.
In terms of market liquidity we find we find that individually
PLFs often operate at times of high utilization, and moreover, of-
ten these moments of high utilization are shared across protocols.
Moreover, we find that token holdings can be concentrated to a very
small set of accounts, such that at any time were a small number of
suppliers to withdraw their funds, perhaps in concert, they could
significantly reduce the liquidity available on markets and perhaps
make such markets illiquid.
In terms of market efficiency, we consider whether uncovered
interest parity holds. On the whole, we find that it does not, sug-
gesting that token markets are at present relatively inefficient. This
also suggests that at present agents may not be fully responsive to
interest rate incentives.
In terms of market dependence we find that the borrowing rates
on these protocols influence each other, an in particular that Com-
pound appears to have some market power to set the prevailing
borrowing rate for Aave and dYdX.
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A APPENDIX
Parameters
Date α β γ U ∗
17 Dec ’19 19637062989 264248265 570776255707 9e17
8 Jan ’20 29174130900 264248265 570776255707 9e17
26 Jan ’20 37372598273 264248265 570776255707 9e17
4 Feb ’20 41997859121 264248265 570776255707 9e17
9 Feb ’20 36209575847 705029680 570776255707 9e17
21 Feb ’20 38532925389 264248265 570776255707 9e17
14 Mar ’20 19637062989 264248265 570776255707 9e17
6 Apr ’20 0 2900146648 570776255707 9e17
21 Apr ’20 0 264248265 570776255707 9e17
27 Apr ’20 0 10569930661 570776255707 9e17
Table 3: Interest rate model and parameter changes for the
cDAI contract since 17th December 2019 (prior to this date
an earlier variation of the interest rate model —‘Jump Rate
Model’—was in force since 23rdNovember 2019; we omit this
period for expositional clarity.).
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Figure 15: DAI cointegrating equation
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Table 4: Vector Error Correction Model Results - DAI.
(1)
D_c_dai
L._ce1 -0.0332
(-0.74)
LD.Compound Dai -0.267∗∗
(-2.84)
L2D.Compound Dai -0.198∗
(-2.07)
L3D.Compound Dai -0.406∗∗∗
(-4.47)
LD.Aave Dai -0.0861
(-1.24)
L2D.Aave Dai -0.0763
(-1.23)
L3D.Aave Dai -0.0718
(-1.22)
Constant -0.000956
(-0.60)
D_a_dai
L._ce1 0.300∗∗∗
(4.44)
LD.Compound Dai -0.247
(-1.75)
L2D.Compound Dai 0.0405
(0.28)
L3D.Compound Dai 0.116
(0.85)
LD.Aave Dai 0.0952
(0.91)
L2D.Aave Dai -0.0843
(-0.90)
L3D.Aave Dai 0.0442
(0.50)
Constant -0.000106
(-0.04)
Long-run (_ce1)
Compound Dai 1
Aave Dai -1.4010∗∗∗
(-5.64)
Constant 0.0402
Observations 117
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 5: Vector Error Correction Model Results - USDC
(abridged).
(1)
D_c_usdc
L._ce1 0.0146
(0.83)
L._ce2 0.0271
(1.89)
Constant -0.000189
(-0.89)
D_a_usdc
L._ce1 0.607∗∗∗
(3.42)
L._ce2 -0.720∗∗∗
(-4.97)
Constant -0.00000564
(-0.00)
D_d_usdc
L._ce1 0.115∗∗
(2.75)
L._ce2 0.0200
(0.59)
Constant 0.0000538
(0.11)
Long-run (_ce1)
Compound USDC 1
Aave USDC 5.55e-17
(-5.64)
DyDx USDC -1.353∗∗∗
(-7.77)
Constant 0.0066
Long-run (_ce2)
Compound USDC -2.78e-17
Aave USDC 1
DyDx USDC -1.3547∗∗∗
(-7.95)
Constant 0.0028
Observations 119
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure 19: USDC cointegrating equations misspecification
test.
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Table 6: Table of UIP results for daily frequency data, using borrowing rates. Using Newey-West heteroscedasticity and auto-
correlation robust standard errors (reported in parentheses.)
Pair N.obs α β R-squared α p-value β p-value Strict form (19) p-value Weak form (20) p-value
(α = 0) (β = 0) (α = 0, β = 1) (β = 1)
eth_bat 393 4.82 -190.15 0.00 0.13 0.26 0.28 0.26
(3.16) (169.19)
eth_zrx 390 3.39 -188.416 0.01 0.20 0.15 0.33 0.14
(2.64) (129.56)
eth_usdc 394 0.61 -6.71869 0.00 0.71 0.74 0.93 0.70
(1.65) (20.01)
eth_dai 176 1.54 -40.2433 0.01 0.09 0.23 0.24 0.22
(0.91) (33.38)
eth_sai 398 0.63 -7.12816 0.00 0.62 0.63 0.83 0.58
(1.26) (14.60)
eth_rep 393 0.01 0.632448 0.00 0.76 0.60 0.93 0.76
(0.04) (1.21)
eth_wbtc 323 -0.00 0.0187401 0.00 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
bat_zrx 388 -0.00 -0.488407 0.03 0.69 0.08 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.27)
bat_usdc 393 0.00 -0.0235904 0.00 0.64 0.44 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
bat_dai 176 0.00 -0.0566 0.02 0.44 0.09 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
bat_sai 394 0.00 -0.0433711 0.01 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
bat_rep 389 0.00 0.00091767 0.00 0.91 0.79 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
bat_wbtc 322 -0.00 2.02298e-05 0.00 0.49 0.17 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
zrx_usdc 389 0.00 -0.0130716 0.00 0.70 0.62 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
zrx_dai 176 0.00 -0.104185 0.03 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.05)
zrx_sai 390 0.00 -0.0150357 0.00 0.55 0.43 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
zrx_rep 388 -0.00 -0.00498626 0.01 0.52 0.06 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
zrx_wbtc 323 2.45 -198.964 0.00 0.54 0.17 0.37 0.17
(3.97) (146.22)
usdc_dai 176 -0.00 -0.00996215 0.00 0.76 0.56 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
usdc_sai 395 0.00 -0.00434315 0.00 0.72 0.56 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
usdc_rep 391 -0.00 -0.00526913 0.00 0.74 0.65 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
usdc_wbtc 323 0.00 5.03898e-05 0.00 0.53 0.32 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
dai_sai 176 0.01 -0.304374 0.01 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.19)
dai_rep 176 -0.00 -0.0178482 0.00 0.26 0.36 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
dai_wbtc 176 -0.00 -7.04281e-06 0.00 0.87 0.56 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
sai_rep 393 -0.00 -0.00807042 0.00 0.48 0.40 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
sai_wbtc 323 0.00 2.80682e-06 0.00 0.71 0.83 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
rep_wbtc 323 190.52 -6996.3 0.00 0.46 0.29 0.58 0.29
(256.85) (6656.79)
Gudgeon et al.
Table 7: Table of UIP results for daily frequency data, using saving rates. Using Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation robust standard errors (reported in parentheses.)
Pair N.obs α β R-squared α p-value β p-value Strict form (19) p-value Weak form (20) p-value
(α = 0) (β = 0) (α = 0, β = 1) (β = 1)
eth_bat 393 2.80 -537.692 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
(1.48) (133.28)
eth_zrx 390 1.66 -587.337 0.01 0.39 0.08 0.21 0.08
(1.91) (334.39)
eth_usdc 394 0.31 -4.25277 0.00 0.82 0.87 0.97 0.84
(1.36) (26.57)
eth_dai 176 1.79 -33.3974 0.01 0.13 0.27 0.30 0.26
(1.18) (30.33)
eth_sai 398 -0.03 -1.06231 0.00 0.96 0.94 0.86 0.88
(0.67) (13.58)
eth_rep 393 0.02 -0.515726 0.00 0.65 0.42 0.05 0.02
(0.04) (0.64)
eth_wbtc 323 -0.00 0.0280198 0.00 0.61 0.29 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
bat_zrx 388 -0.00 -1.43274 0.05 0.82 0.01 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.53)
bat_usdc 393 0.00 -0.0274316 0.00 0.71 0.53 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.04)
bat_dai 176 0.00 -0.0446404 0.01 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.03)
bat_sai 394 0.00 -0.0296474 0.01 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
bat_rep 389 -0.00 0.000633516 0.00 0.94 0.88 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
bat_wbtc 322 -0.00 3.02049e-05 0.00 0.68 0.27 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
zrx_usdc 389 0.00 -0.0109202 0.00 0.80 0.76 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.04)
zrx_dai 176 0.00 -0.0664562 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.04)
zrx_sai 390 0.00 -0.0128454 0.00 0.62 0.44 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
zrx_rep 388 -0.00 -0.0135104 0.01 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
zrx_wbtc 323 1.14 -309.027 0.00 0.78 0.28 0.55 0.28
(4.06) (284.24)
usdc_dai 176 0.00 -0.0155567 0.00 0.36 0.47 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
usdc_sai 395 0.00 -0.00543319 0.00 0.68 0.47 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
usdc_rep 391 -0.00 -0.0078275 0.00 0.71 0.58 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
usdc_wbtc 323 0.00 5.37893e-05 0.00 0.61 0.48 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
dai_sai 176 -0.00 -0.245108 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.15)
dai_rep 176 -0.00 -0.0166743 0.00 0.29 0.39 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.02)
dai_wbtc 176 -0.00 -6.00555e-06 0.00 0.72 0.69 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
sai_rep 393 -0.00 -0.00886606 0.00 0.49 0.36 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01)
sai_wbtc 323 0.00 3.95176e-06 0.00 0.67 0.80 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
rep_wbtc 323 89.68 -14664.9 0.00 0.67 0.27 0.55 0.27
(209.43) (13320.00)
DeFi Protocols for Loanable Funds:
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Figure 16: USDC cointegrating equation 1
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Figure 17: USDC cointegrating equation 2.
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Figure 18: DAI cointegrating equationsmisspecification test.
